Order to shut access to Wikileaks doesn't shut access to Wikileaks

Last Friday, a California court ordered that domain name registrar Dynadot remove DNS information that routes Internet users to wikileaks.org, a site that provides a place for people to leak documents or blow whistles on corporations or governments.

Our friends at the Citizen Media Law Project have some fantastic analysis of the issues inherent with ordering the site to be rendered inaccessible, here and here, and they continue to dig through the various complaints and orders for some sense of understanding. The justifications for the order are weak, and there is no U.S. precedent for ordering the shutdown of an entire site based on the complaints of one organization affected by activities on the site. The complaint is vague, while the suggested remedy is specific and ineffective.

It has been pointed out by Jonathan Zittrain, Nart Villeneuve, Wikipedia's article on wikileaks, and others that the site is not inaccessible. It is available directly via entering the IP address, http://88.80.13.160/, and on mirror sites such as those found here (http://www.wikileaks.be), here (http://wikileaks.org.uk), here (http://wikileaks.cx), here (http://wikileaks.in).

The blocking of this site by removal of DNS information is such an easily circumventable method it is hard to believe the parties might have thought it would be an effective means for stopping access.